主体的“权力”既可能消极地表现为凌驾性,也可能积极地表现为“酌情善断”,而且首先是有权“酌情”。准确的酌情,是善断的前提和基础,“善断”是“知情”而断。
“酌情善断”就是“act at one's best discretion”。德国现象学(phenomenology)的创始者胡塞尔(E.Husserl,1859-1938)对“善断”有一段精辟的论述:
Meanwhile no inclination is more dangerous to the "seeing" cognition of origins and absolute data than to think too much, and from these reflections in thought to create supposed self-evident principles. Principles which for the most part are not at all explicitly formulated and hence are not subject to any critique based on "seeing" but rather implicitly determine and unjustifiably limit the direction of investigation. "Seeing" cognition is that form of reason which sets itself the task of converting the understanding into reason. The understanding is not to be allowed to interrupt and to insert its unredeemed bank notes among the certified ones; and its method of convertion and exchange, based on mere treasury bonds, is not questioned here.
在胡塞尔的语汇中“seeing”就是“直觉”,“seeing cognition”是直观认识。胡塞尔反对“在大多数情况下根本无法加以明确表述的“自明性原则”( “ ... self evident principles...which for the most part are not at all explicitly formulated..."),相当于我们常说的“相当然尔”。胡氏强调的是“具有理性形式”、可以“将知性(understanding)转化为理性(reason)”的直观认识。翻译的主体认识也应该是这样。我们不能“想当然尔”,单单依靠不能(常常也是来不及细细推敲)将其推向理性的知性行事(看懂就译),没有做到酌情善断,也就是使discretion 力臻为“上佳状态”(at its best)。
“想当然尔”最常产生于典籍翻译中。正因为是翻译典籍,主体的主导性可能被压抑,由凌驾性走向另一个极端—一盲从所谓圣贤“无谬论”(infallibility),或至少是走向被动。以西晋文学家陆机《c261-c303)的《文赋》为例。《文赋》探索“作文利害之所由”,《文赋·序》是很有影响的一篇创作论典籍。但就是这样一篇著名的创作论,也并不是百事无谬。刘勰(c465-c532)在《文心雕龙》中就批评陆机说“陆赋巧而碎乱”(〈序志》)。我们以《文赋》中论构思的一段文章为例。为便于论述,我们将他的文句编了号:
(1) 其始也,皆收视反听,耽思傍讯。(2)精骛八极,心游万仞。(3)其致也,情疃咙而弥鲜,物昭晰而互进。(4)倾群言之沥液,漱六艺之芳润。(5)浮天渊以安流,濯下泉而潜浸。(6)于是沈辞怫悦,若游鱼衔勾而出重渊之深;(7)浮藻联翩,若翰鸟缨缴而堕曾云之峻。(8)收百代之阙文,采千载之遗韵,(9)谢朝华于已披,启夕秀于未振。(10)观古今于须灾,抚四海于一瞬。
下面的译文取自 Anthology of Chinese Literature (edited by Cyril Birch,N.Y:Grove Press,1965);我们也按译文编了号: